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1. Introduction
In spite of mixed experiences (e.g., Adato et al. 2005; Mansuri and Rao 2013), people’s participation and social accountability (e.g., Joshi and 
Houtzager 2012) as mechanisms to foster transparency and improve public 
program delivery in developing countries are, once more, in vogue. In the 
public work projects implemented under India’s largest program to date, the 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA; 
Government of India 2005), “social” audits have been made mandatory. The 
responsibility for audit implementation is vested with gram sabhas (p. 9, 
Section 17, I and II of the Act), which are plenary meetings of adult resi-
dents of gram panchayats (GPs) (village councils). The Act thus empowers 
intended beneficiaries to scrutinize program expenditures and to monitor 
and keep track of program delivery.1
Without sufficient institutional support, however, the expectation that 
beneficiary-led audits should spontaneously arise is unsustainable. Inspired 
by the civil rights movement spearheaded by the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti 
Sangathan (MKSS)2 in Rajasthan and other similar initiatives, the state 
government of Andhra Pradesh (AP) responded swiftly to this weakness in 
the Act (Aiyar et al. 2013). The early establishment of a pilot audit scheme 
was followed by the first steps toward a full institutionalization of the social 
audit process in the state (ibid.). By November 2007, social audits had been 
implemented in 400 of AP’s 650 MGNREGA Phase-I sub-districts, a record 
no other Indian state can match (Aakella and Kidambi 2007).3
The AP social audit model is perceived as successful both within and 
beyond India’s borders (Subbarao et al. 2013). The scaling up of this model 
to other Indian states makes it pertinent to distil lessons about what these 
affordable audits have been able to achieve so far.4 To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to rigorously assess the impacts of a 
1. In a study of Food for Work Programs in three districts of AP, predating MGNREGA, 
Deshingkhar and Johnson (2003) highlight the democratic deficiencies of gram sabhas. 
2. Translated into English, MKSS is short for the Association for the Empowerment of 
Workers and Peasants.
3. This first phase implementation of MGNREGA started in February 2006 and targeted 
the 200 poorest districts in the country. 
4. The cost of social audit implementation in AP has been low, absorbing between 0.5 and 
1% of annual MGNREGA expenditure. The Ministry of Rural Development, Government 
of India, issued a circular to all state governments in 2012 earmarking up to 1% of annual 
MGNREGA expenditure for social audits.
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large-scale community monitoring initiative in India. By highlighting the 
strengths and shortfalls of AP’s unique social audit experience, our aim is 
to improve effectiveness of community monitoring in AP and elsewhere.
The ideal design for identifying the causal effect of social audits on pro-
gram delivery would be to randomize social audit implementation. Since 
the social audits in AP were not rolled out randomly, districts where social 
audits were conducted early may have had more (or fewer) program failures 
than districts audited later on. Comparing MGNREGA outcomes between 
early and late social audit recipients could therefore distort estimates of 
audit impacts.
In this paper we adopt the next best strategy by resorting to a panel data 
set assembled through meticulous extraction and translation of informa-
tion from original social audit reports. The panel covers the years 2006–10 
and comprises official data from up to three rounds of social audits from 
an initial sample of 300 GPs in eight districts of AP. Our analysis focuses 
on whether program performance measured by irregularities in program 
implementation—the immediate concern of social audits as well as employ-
ment and program expenditures—is affected by additional audits within the 
same sub-district over time.
Among these performance indicators, we prioritize outcomes that relate 
directly to malpractices and irregularities that speak to widespread concerns 
about leakages and corruption in large public programs in India.5 In addition, 
data on the local bureaucracy and elected panchayats enable us to assess the 
interaction between local government characteristics and program leakages 
which is crucial for improving public program delivery. We control trends 
that could potentially impact the quality of program delivery and corruption: 
mandal-level (subdistrict-level) attributes and secular and district-level time 
trends to account for and filter out the potential rise in households’ aware-
ness about program entitlements, the growing sophistication of audit teams, 
and the general rise in program activity.
Once we address these potential confounders, for our study period, we 
detect a positive but insignificant effect of social audits on employment 
generation and find no effect on the aggregate number of MGNREGA 
irregularities detected by the audit process. We find a marginally signifi-
cant decline in the complaint amount per labor-related irregularity. This 
is accompanied by an increase in more sophisticated and harder-to-detect 
5. Other likely effects and potential benefits from social audit participation are discussed 
later. 
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material-related irregularities.6 These main results are robust to sensitivity 
checks that account for reporting biases and the potential endogeneity of 
audit intensity. We conclude that while audits may be effective in detect-
ing irregularities, their impact, if any, on deterring malpractice is modest. 
This highlights the need for a time-bound process where transgressors are 
punished and responsibilities for follow up of social audit findings are laid 
out and credibly enforced.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a 
brief review of experiences with participation and bottom-up monitoring of 
public service delivery. We focus, selectively, on monitoring processes that 
quite closely resemble AP’s social audits. Section 3 narrates the development 
of the social audit model of AP. Section 4 describes the data and presents 
descriptive statistics while Section 5 explains our conceptual framework. 
The estimation methodology is presented in Section 6. Results are discussed 
in Section 7 while Section 8 concludes and spells out the policy implications.
2. Literature Review
Our theoretical entry point is the question of whether a particular form of 
monitoring or auditing affects the quality of public service delivery. This is 
tangential to the broader theme of community-based development, and to 
questions of social accountability and whether “participation” works (e.g., 
Joshi and Houtzager 2012; Mansuri and Rao 2013).7 As noted by Aiyar 
et al. (2013: p. 251), the vision of the MKSS is embedded in a discourse on 
rights-based democratic action, where social audits not only represent an 
anti-corruption tool but “a platform on which citizens can be empowered to 
directly exercise their democratic rights.” Social audits thus ensure bottom-
up involvement and opportunities for stakeholders to learn by doing through 
the repeated interaction with audit teams and as the process of MGNREGA 
delivery unfolds.8
6. In our conceptual framework, we link this to learning among beneficiaries, auditors, and 
transgressors and attempt to decipher the underlying logic of this shift. 
7. Mansuri and Rao (2013) distinguish, conceptually, between “organic” and “induced” 
participation. The AP social audit model is an example of induced participation. 
8. Conceptually this resembles Joshi and Houtzager’s (2012: p.146) definition of social 
accountability as “citizen-led action for demanding accountability from providers” which privi-
leges the “short” and direct route to service providers (Ringold et al. 2012). This is in contrast 
to the “long” and indirect route—via the electoral process—to improve service delivery (ibid.). 
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In a particularly relevant study, Adato et al. (2005) seek to identify the 
impacts of “participation” on the quality of public work programs in South 
Africa. Evidence from 101 South African public work programs suggests 
that participation—conceptualized and measured as varying in degree, e.g., 
where the community is either the sole decision-maker, a joint decision-
maker or taking on an advisory role—is reported to strongly affect scheme 
performance as measured by the project budget share spent on labor, log 
number of days of work created, and the log number of training days on offer.
The suggestion, thus, is that local stakeholder involvement affects deliv-
ery along dimensions that the same stakeholders or beneficiaries can be 
expected to care deeply about. Even if such effects on the quality of delivery 
were not immediately discernible, for instance because learning operates 
with a time-lag, exposure to and participation in a social audit is likely to 
bolster awareness about MGNREGA entitlements and rules.9
Thus, a plausible conjecture is that participatory audits are more likely 
to be effective when addressing program outcomes with high beneficiary 
stakes. High stakes may not, however, be sufficient since beneficiaries also 
need the knowledge or capacity to act on their interests (as represented by 
their stakes).10 This begs the question of how best to strengthen beneficiary 
capacity. In MGNREGA, beneficiary learning appears to take place mainly 
“by doing” which may limit the effectiveness of participatory audits for 
outcomes that are less transparent and irregularities that are hard to detect. 
The capacity to detect is, in general, likely to depend on the complexity of 
relevant public program outcomes, as suggested by Khemani (2008). We 
return to this discussion later.
A few studies have touched upon the effectiveness of community-based 
monitoring. Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) (BS from now on) report the 
findings of experimentally induced community monitoring of health care 
provision in Uganda. Their intervention comprised of a two afternoon com-
munity meetings where a variety of participatory methods were introduced 
to “encourage community members to develop a shared view on how to 
improve service delivery and to monitor the provider” (ibid.). Information 
on patient rights and entitlements was disseminated while focus group dis-
cussions were organized to reach out to and absorb the views of marginal-
ized groups. Local suggestions for improvements, and how to obtain these 
9. Some such findings are reported in Aiyar et al. (2013) and, in addition to the above, 
include changes in the perceptions of government officials and greater confidence to approach 
such officials. 
10. Ringold et al. (2012) highlight the importance of capacity. 
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without injecting additional resources, were synthesized in an action plan. 
Simple as this may sound, it is not very different from what a well organized 
social audit would set out to achieve.11
The next step in the intervention closely resembles the public hearing in 
the AP social audit model: a one afternoon event at the health facility where 
all staff is present followed by a meeting between community members and 
health staff. The final and mandatory outcome of this process is a “contract,” 
a shared and agreed plan of action that sets out what needs to be done, how, 
by whom, and by when.
The simplicity is an appealing aspect of the BS design and in spite of the 
limited duration, the reported impacts are remarkable. Apart from affecting 
process monitoring, service delivery improvements are reported for a series 
of relevant outcomes. There are ultimately impacts on health, including a 
radical decline in under-5 mortality.
In another community mobilization attempt, this time to improve the 
quality of public education provision in Uttar Pradesh (UP), Banerjee 
et al. (2010) shared information about the quality of schools, report cards 
showing children’s reading ability and possible routes for improvement 
(e.g., via Village Education Committees) in community meetings where 
teachers, local government representatives, and village residents were all 
present. In contrast to BS, this particular evaluation found no impact of 
such village-wide meetings on community participation, teacher effort, or 
learning outcomes.12
If, as in the Uganda example, transformative effects can be achieved 
through such simple interventions, optimism on behalf of the AP social audit 
model seems justified given the many parallels between the BS interven-
tion and the AP model. But what about the lessons from UP? A comparison 
between the UP and the Uganda interventions may, as Khemani (2008) 
suggests, throws up a fundamental contrast between the experience of or 
observability of substandard teaching and the quality of health services 
which local users may possibly have a better eye for and comprehension 
of. Put differently, community mobilization to improve education provision 
11. There is a notable tension between the short-term and snapshot interventions BS (2009) 
and Banerjee et al. (2010) report on and the longer term engagements advocated and deemed 
necessary in the social accountability literature (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). 
12. BS’s and Banerjee et al.’s (2010) identification of impacts were made easier by ran-
domized interventions: the attribution of desirable change to social audits, on the other hand, 
is made harder both by the absence of a credible source of exogenous variation in the quality 
of social audits and by the likelihood that problem areas are more likely to attract audits.
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may involve tougher pedagogical challenges. While stakes are expected to 
be high for both health and education, initial capacity constraints may be 
more binding for educational outcomes. A similar argument may apply to the 
distinction between labor and material-related irregularities in MGNREGA 
projects.
Another missing ingredient, both in the AP model and the UP interven-
tion, is the “contractual outlay” to address grievances and how, by whom, 
and by what time these grievances should be addressed. This underscores the 
importance of effective grievance redressal in community-based monitoring 
efforts: hence, even if the AP social audit process is found to be effective 
in detecting irregularities, this would be a necessary but not sufficient con-
dition to deter irregularities. What difference would it have made to BS’s 
result if the final contract had been omitted? We return to this issue in our 
discussion of policy implications.
3.  The History of Public Works and the Genesis of the AP Social 
Audit Model
Prior to MGNREGA, and like other Indian states, AP’s performance in 
the implementation of public works was often dismal (Aiyar et al. 2013) 
and regularly undermined by the capture of vested interests, in particular 
through collusion between private contractors and local politicians (e.g., 
Deshingkhar and Johnson 2003).13
The social audit process was initiated in AP by setting up the Strategy and 
Performance Innovation Unit (SPIU) under the state’s Rural Development 
Department in 2006. SPIU was mandated with conducting the social audits 
of MGNREGA projects and headed by a director, a state civil servant, 
and assisted by a consultant, formerly with the MKSS. Eventually, the 
responsibility for conducting regular and systematic audits of MGNREGA 
projects was transferred to a new and autonomous arm of the Department 
of Rural Development (the Society for Social Audits, Accountability and 
Transparency (SSAAT)) in May 2009. As of today, the SSAAT director is 
an independent consultant and not part of the state government.
This initiative makes AP unique and distinct from other Indian states 
where audits have either not been conducted or been implemented in an 
13. As part of our retrospective household survey in 2011, we asked 1,500 beneficiary 
households in AP about their satisfaction with the scheme. While indicative, we found a strong 
stakeholder endorsement and satisfaction with MGNREGA in AP. 
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ad hoc and unsystematic manner.14 AP’s record on social audit implemen-
tation is similarly unique. Systematic and standardized audits have been 
carried out in all 23 districts of AP with an average of over two rounds of 
audits completed per GP between 2006 and 2010.
3.1. The Social Audit Process in AP15
The first step in conducting the social audit is a notification to the relevant 
sub-district or mandal office with reference to Right to Information (RTI) 
obligations and requesting unrestricted access to muster-rolls and other rel-
evant MGNREGA project documents (ibid.). A team comprising state and 
district auditors will, upon their arrival in the mandal headquarter, first recruit 
and then, in a two-day workshop, intensively train village social auditors 
about MGNREGA rights and regulations, how to conduct the social audits, 
and how to obtain information under RTI legislation (ibid.). The village 
social auditors are MGNREGA beneficiaries and residents of the mandal.
The social audit teams will then, over a period of about a week, organize 
social audits in all GPs of the mandal. In each GP, official labor expenses 
are verified by visiting laborers listed in the worksite logs (“muster-rolls”). 
Complaints by individuals or groups of beneficiaries and the audit team 
are recorded and attested using a standardized audit report template.16 For 
verification of material expenditure, the audit team is mandated to undertake 
worksite inspections. Except for the more obvious and easy-to-detect (ETD) 
irregularities such as “ghost” or non-existent projects, the verification of 
material expenditure is typically perceived to be more complex and demand-
ing. Thus, the social audit process in AP uniquely combines a top-down 
approach (i.e., timing and conduct of audits controlled by the SSAAT) with 
grassroots participation (i.e., village social auditors and local stakeholders).
Once the audits of all GPs have been completed, a mandal-level public 
hearing with mandatory attendance for all implementing officials is organ-
ized to discuss the audit findings. Those present, typically include “wage 
seekers from the villages in the mandal, the social audit team, branch post-
master, key implementing officials, members of the vigilance cell, elected 
representatives, and a district-level ombudsman” (Aiyar et al. 2013: p. 261). 
14. Even though some states have recently responded to the Act by conducting “regular” 
social audits, the exercise has been largely superficial with claims of no irregularities in 
program implementation.
15. In narrating the content of the AP social audit model, we draw extensively on Aiyar 
et al. (2013).
16. The auditors are expected to verify labor records for all beneficiaries. This may not 
be true in practice.
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Complaints will be read out, testimonies verified, and accused officials given 
an opportunity to defend themselves.
After the public hearing a decision taken report (DTR) is created by the 
officer presiding over the hearing. In this report the responsibility for each 
confirmed malfeasance is pinned on a program functionary or, as the case 
may be, on multiple functionaries.17 Until 2010, the mechanism for redress-
ing issues raised by the social audit and mentioned in DTRs was weak.18 
However, in 2010, the state set up a vigilance cell within the Department of 
Rural Development (Aiyar et al. 2013). Under this mechanism, copies of the 
DTRs are sent to key program functionaries for follow-up action within days 
of the public hearing, including the district vigilance officer. The vigilance 
office then issues an action taken report (ATR) which lists the action taken 
against errant officials in the DTR (ibid.).
4. Data
Our panel data were extracted and codified from the official and original 
Telugu social audit reports for 100 randomly sampled mandals across eight 
districts of AP.19 In each randomly chosen mandal, three GPs were selected 
based on the following criteria: the GP which was the administrative head-
quarter of the mandal, one GP randomly selected from all GPs reserved for 
a female sarpanch, and one randomly selected from GPs not reserved for a 
female sarpanch in that mandal in 2006. Our initial sample, thus, comprises 
300 GPs from 100 mandals.
The GP-audit reports have two components: a standard audit report card 
which records the date of the audit along with the demographic characteris-
tics of the GP, and more importantly, audit team impressions about process 
performance since the last audit including a financial misappropriations 
estimate. These impressions and estimates are based largely on the second 
component of the audit report—the list of complaints filed by individuals, 
groups, or by audit team members. The complaints are recorded during the 
17. The SSAAT has introduced checks and balances to prevent local program functionaries 
who are being audited from corrupting audit team members.
18. In the above parlance, the social audit process lacked procedural tightness. 
19. These eight districts were Mahbubnagar, Medak, Nizamabad, Warangal, and Khammam 
(north or the Telangana region), Anantpur and Kurnool (south or the Rayalseema region), 
and Guntur (west or the coastal region). MGNREGA was implemented in February 2006 in 
all these districts, except Kurnool and Guntur, which implemented the program from April, 
2007 onward.
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door-to-door verification of labor expenditures and during project site inspec-
tions to verify material expenditures by technical members of the audit team. 
Each complaint is supported by affidavits and brought up during the public 
hearing. As noted earlier, during the public hearing the responsibility for 
each complaint is pinned on one or multiple MGNREGA functionary(-ies). 
We use data on all verified complaints, following the public hearing.
These data are available from the first round of audits that began in 2006 
and until 2010.20 We construct a panel of audit reports for each GP with an 
average of over two reports per GP for the period 2006–10. We supplement 
the official audit data with data from interviews with the mandal parishad 
development officer (MPDO) and the GP sarpanch elected in 2006 for a five 
year term. These retrospective surveys were conducted during April–June, 
2011. Data from the Census (2001) provide village-level characteristics such 
as infrastructure and access to public services.
In addition to the audit data, we also obtained information on program 
performance from the Department of Rural Development’s (AP) web site 
for the financial years 2006–07 to 2010–11.21 These data on program expen-
ditures and employment were cumulated across financial years prior to the 
financial year in which the audit occurred and then linked to each GP by 
the audit date. The data, therefore, inform us about program expenditures 
and person days of work covered in each audit. We also linked program 
expenditures and person days of work generated post audit (and before the 
next audit) to each GP to assess the effect of an audit on subsequent program 
performance.
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
The social audit data facilitate comparisons by audit round and complaint 
type. Table 1 presents a breakdown of the average number of complaints 
by type across all rounds. We categorize complaints into three types—
labor related, those related to materials used in MGNREGA projects, and 
the provision of work-site facilities mandated by the Act—labeled “other 
complaints”. Labor complaints account for 87% of all complaints. This is 
not surprising since the problems that trigger labor complaints more directly 
affect beneficiary households. At the same time, the average real amount per 
20. Original audit reports that were missing were supplemented with abridged versions of the 
audit reports available from the SSAAT web site: http://125.17.121.162/SocialAudit/ Web site
21. The following link was accessed between July–August, 2013 to obtain information on 
program expenditures and employment: http://nrega.ap.gov.in/Nregs/FrontServlet?requestT
ype=NewReportsRH&actionVal=Display&page=Newreportcenter_ajax_eng
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material-related irregularity (`28,786) was more than twice the real amount 
per labor-related irregularity (`10,289) over the three audit rounds.
Table 2 shows trends by complaint type. If we restrict attention to audit 
rounds 1–3, there is a discernible rise in the total number of complaints 
between rounds 1 and 3 (Row 1), driven mainly by a disproportionate 
increase in the number of material complaints (173%) relative to the increase 
in the number of labor complaints (13%).22
T A B L E  2 .  Number of Complaints by Audit Round
Variable
Audit 1 Audit 2 Audit 3
N=284 N=261 N=166
all complaints 5.123
(4.306) 
6.249
(5.375) 
6.349
(6.487) 
labor complaints 4.602
(4.067) 
5.475
(4.995) 
5.199
(4.739) 
material complaints 0.415
(0.740) 
0.689
(1.186) 
1.132
(2.541) 
other complaints  0.105
(0.370)
0.084
(0.304) 
0.018
(0.133) 
Source: authors’ calculations from data extracted from official social audit reports.
note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 3 disaggregates the type of complaint by audit round and captures 
broad trends: the rise in labor complaints appears to be mainly driven by 
administrative inefficiencies, specifically, a sharp rise in complaints for 
22. There are notable differences in trends in irregularities across districts as shown in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. The district-wise trends in the number of complaints suggest 
that the five Telangana districts feature among the seven worst districts, with Anantapur 
and Kurnool only marginally worse than the best Telangana district (Medak). For material 
complaints, the Telangana districts are the five worst districts. This is suggestive of a different 
political economy of MGNREGA irregularities in Telangana. It is also evident that the average 
number of complaints is increasing, and dramatically in four of the five Telangana districts, 
with Khammam as the only and very notable exception. For Anantapur and Kurnool, audit 3 
numbers are lower than everywhere else, but we have few third round audits in these districts. 
T A B L E  1 .  Summary Statistics Across All gram panchayats
Variable Number of audits Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
all complaints 711 5.822 5.298 0 43
labor complaints 711 5.061 4.594 0 30
material complaints 711 0.683 1.519 0 18
other complaints 711 0.077 0.306 0 3
Source: authors’ calculations from data extracted from official social audit reports.
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delayed payment or non-payment of wages over the three audit rounds. In 
contrast, we register a steep decline in complaints related to non-provision 
of work. Impersonations/benami wage payments and excess wage payments/
bribes also decline, but marginally, between audits 1 and 3. There is no sig-
nificant change in the audit teams’ access to wage records as shown in the 
row “wage records missing.” For the material component, grievances related 
to “non-existent work” and “excess payments/bribes” rose significantly 
alongside a sharp drop in irregularities related to “poor quality of materials.” 
We also observe an increase in missing materials expenditure records.23
Finally, Table 4 summarizes program outcomes audited in each round. 
Real program expenditures more than doubled in the period after the first 
audit. Water conservation projects had the highest share of total program 
expenditure in audit 1 but this share along with that of drought and flood 
control fell in subsequent audits. There was a marginal increase in the share 
23. Note that if expenditure records (viz. receipts of materials purchased) are not available 
to the audit team and those expenditures have been officially incurred, the auditors interpret 
this as leakage of program funds.
T A B L E  3 .  Proportion of Type of Complaint by Audit Round
Variable Audit 1 Audit 2 Audit 3
Labor related N=262 N=236 N=151
non-payment/delay in wages 28.385
(29.469)
34.778
(32.982)
47.802
(33.870)
non-provision of work 15.012
(23.794)
10.001
(20.238)
7.697
(18.048)
Impersonations/benami wage payments 19.301
(27.418)
26.023
(30.511)
16.901
(25.996)
Excess wage payments/bribes 19.883
(26.958)
15.850
(23.399)
14.376
(20.559)
Wage records missing 6.6034
(14.371)
6.023
(14.807)
6.711
(15.634)
Material related N=86 N=96 N=65
non-existent work 14.438
(32.070)
28.675
(39.484)
25.146
(37.783)
poor quality of materials 44.864
(47.489)
18.663
(34.787)
6.239
(24.206)
Excess payments/bribes 15.310
(35.073)
30.092
(40.253)
50.727
(43.325)
Expenditure records missing 4.360
(19.247)
4.513
(18.961)
8.183
(23.125)
Source: authors’ calculations from data extracted from official social audit reports.
note: Standard errors in parentheses. Statistics conditional on a labor/material complaint being filed in an 
audit in a Gp. missing category of “other” in both labor and material-related complaint.
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of program expenditures on rural connectivity works from audit 1 to 3. On 
employment generation, total person days increased almost threefold during 
this period but there were no significant changes in the share of SC (marginal 
decline) or ST (marginal increase) person days. Thus, overall, we observe 
a sharp rise in program activity during the study period.
While the summary statistics are suggestive of the trends in program per-
formance, our main challenge is to obtain convincing clues about the impacts 
of social audits on corruption and on the quality of program delivery. We 
introduce our conceptual framework before addressing the methodological 
challenges.
5. Conceptual Framework: Linking Stakes, Capacity, and Learning
Except for Joshi and Houtzager’s (2012: p. 155) emphasis on the need “to 
examine social accountability actions as one part of a broader and longer 
process of engagement between collective actors and the state”, the existing 
literature tends to bypass the repeated behavioral interactions between and 
learning by beneficiaries, social audit teams, and public officials (transgres-
sors) that repeated social audits may give rise to.
T A B L E  4 .  Program Performance by Audit Round
Variable
Audit 1 Audit 2 Audit 3
N=282 N=255 N=161
Total expenditure (in 2006 rupees, lakhs) 8.906
(14.1)
22.488
(22.944)
23.117
(24.725)
proportion of water conservation works 0.441
(0.305)
0.287
(0.243)
0.190
(0.189)
proportion of drought and flood control
proportion of rural connectivity works
Total employment generated in person days
0.086
(0.160)
0.023
(0.081)
11615.71
(18626.6)
0.027
(0.081)
0.086
(0.153)
31314.55
(36375.54)
0.012
(0.072)
0.089
(0.138)
33104.46
(36721.22)
proportion of Sc person days generated
proportion of ST person days generated
0.298
(0.264)
0.122
(0.249)
0.275
(0.221)
0.136
(0.268)
0.253
(0.179)
0.156
(0.276)
Source: authors’ calculations from data extracted from official social audit reports.
note: Standard errors in parentheses. Expenditure deflated using the consumer price index for rural labor 
(http://labourbureau.nic.in/indtab.pdf), with base year as 2006. rows (2)–(4) are calculated as proportions 
of row (1). rows (6)–(7) are calculated as a proportion of row (5).
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This section outlines some basic assumptions we make about the behav-
ioral response of all actors in the audit process that aid the interpretation of 
our empirical results. We first assume that the state commits to conducting 
regular social audits. However, the first round of the social audit, given low 
state credibility, takes public officials (or transgressors) by surprise. Further, 
the cost of effort for basic program delivery transgressions is low. Second, 
local MGNREGA beneficiaries have high stakes in employment availability 
and in timely and due pay. There is, moreover, sufficient capacity on the 
part of audit teams and local beneficiaries to detect transgressions in basic 
program delivery.
As a result, we expect more ETD irregularities in the initial audit round. 
In subsequent audit rounds, beneficiaries may become more effective par-
ticipants while auditors become more adept. We should, thus, observe a 
decline in ETD irregularities. At the same time, transgressors expect audits 
in the future and benefit from staying one step ahead of the auditors.
We thus anticipate an evolving dynamic process with improved audit-
ing and signs of more effective local participation through learning. The 
drawback is that transgressions may also become more sophisticated. The 
introduction of monitoring may thus result in substitutions of one type 
of irregularity for another as transgressors learn to manipulate the new 
system while discovering other avenues for rent extraction (Olken and 
Pande 2011). Hence, if we assume that auditors’ learning is unable to catch 
up with learning by those who are audited, then we would observe more 
harder-to-detect irregularities.24 Figure 1 links, in a simplified manner, our 
discussion of beneficiary capacity and stakes to this evolving process of 
learning and response.
Our assumptions are borne out by the data. While AP had conducted 
multiple audits in all mandals by 2010–11, state commitment to monitoring 
had no precedent. Further, in the first audit round, 80% of all labor-related 
complaints were filed by local beneficiaries. Roughly half of these were in 
the “hard-to-detect (HTD)” category. Among beneficiaries, therefore, stakes 
appear to trump complexity from the start. In contrast, social audit teams 
submitted 80% of the material complaints in the first audit round. By audit 
round 2, there was already a greater diversity in beneficiary complaints, 
with a higher share of material complaints, spread across ETD and HTD. 
24. However, even if audits become more effective in detecting irregularities, deterrence 
may remain weak. In order to change transgressor behavior, we thus need to assume either 
that being caught is sufficiently “costly” even in the absence of formal punishment or that 
beliefs about strong, future punishment are widespread.
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By audit round 3, the latter accounted for 60% of the material complaints 
filed by beneficiaries.
Contrast this with the complaints filed by the social audit team which 
divide, more sharply, between ETD and HTD irregularities, for labor and 
materials and change little over time: the share of HTD irregularities in 
all labor complaints submitted by the audit team is never below 88%. For 
material complaints, the corresponding audit team figure is 76%. The share 
of HTD irregularities filed by the audit team for both labor and material 
complaints, however, increases by about 10 percentage points from audit 
round 1 to 3. These observations suggest that the social audit process imparts 
substantive learning on local beneficiaries. At the same time, and given that 
the large majority of social audit team complaints involve HTD irregulari-
ties, beneficiary learning is not sufficient to ensure that the participatory part 
of the process can fully handle the more complex labor and material irregu-
larities. The top-down part—represented by the social audit team—and the 
participatory process, thus, appear to perform vital complementary roles.25
25. Olken (2009) finds that top–down audits may be more effective in curtailing corruption 
in public programs as opposed to a bottoms–up approach envisaged by community monitoring. 
F I G U R E  1 .  Beneficiary Stakes and Capacity of Participatory Social Audits
Sufficient capacity 
at the outset
limited capacity at 
the outset; capacity 
improvement through 
learning
High stakes—
labor component 
low stakes—
material component
Easy-to-detect:
non-payment/delay  
in wages
non-availability of work
Hard-to-detect:
Ghost workers
Bribes 
Easy-to-detect:
Ghost projects
Hard-to-detect:
Bribes
Sub-standard quality  
of materials
missing expenditure records
Source: authors’ calculations from data extracted from official social audit reports.
note: ETd labor-related irregularities comprise of non- and delayed wage payment and non-availability 
of work. HTd labor-related irregularities comprise of benami and bribes. ETd material-related irregularities 
relates to “ghost” or non-existent project. HTd material-related irregularities comprise material bribes, 
substandard material quality, and missing material records.
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To summarize, if audits effectively detect malfeasance and the threat 
of punishment for malfeasance is credible, we expect ETD irregularities 
to decline with repeated audits. At the same time, we expect more HTD 
irregularities in later audit rounds due to the increasing sophistication of 
transgressors even as auditors and beneficiaries learn.26 
6. Methodology
As noted, we take advantage of the panel structure of the data to assess 
whether program implementation improves with repeated social audits 
within the same mandal, over time, while controlling other trends that could 
potentially impact corruption and the quality of program delivery.
Our main specification is given by:
  Outcomenjklt =  a0 + ∑an Auditn + a4Xjkl + a5Dk + ∑ηt Yeart  
+ ∑ γlt (Dl*Yeart)+µnjklt (1)
The analysis is conducted at the GP-audit level. The findings of social audit 
n in GP j in mandal k in district l in year t is denoted by Outcomenjklt. Our 
outcomes comprise the different complaint variables described in section 4. 
The main coefficient of interest is the round of the social audit, or Auditn, 
n taking values 2 and 3 with the first audit as the reference year. The coef-
ficient on Auditn will tell us whether, relative to the first audit, irregularities 
in program implementation are higher or lower. Xjkl is a vector of time-
invariant GP-level characteristics that includes attributes of the sarpanch 
elected in 2006 (for a five year term) such as gender, caste, education and 
age, the GP’s access to health and education facilities, and the distance from 
the nearest town. It also includes a dummy variable for whether the GP is 
the mandal headquarter.
A few factors may confound the interpretation of an. First, recall that the 
audit is conducted at the level of the mandal. All GPs within a mandal are 
audited by a single audit team within a period of about one week. Some 
Villagers’ perception of corruption in a village road construction program in Indonesia rose 
by only 0.8% when actual corruption in the program rose by 10%. 
26. In an ideal scenario, one would use independent measures of corruption or malfea-
sance in the program. Unfortunately, data are available only for malfeasance reported in the 
social audits. This is likely to be an underestimate of the true level of corruption or the true 
number of irregularities since some beneficiaries may not register their complaints, e.g., due 
to threats or intimidation.
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mandals may be systematically better or worse at administering the program 
since the mandal-level bureaucracy plays a critical role in MGNREGA 
implementation. We therefore use mandal-level dummies, Dk., to control 
this unobserved variation in the timing of the audit and in mandal-level 
implementation capability.
Second, the social audit findings, reported as the complaint types dis-
cussed earlier, might be influenced by (a) changes in awareness about 
program entitlements or beneficiary confidence in the integrity of the audit 
process because of repeated exposure and (b) by improvements in audit qual-
ity as audit team members become more adept at detecting discrepancies. 
For the former, with constant implementation quality, we would observe an 
increase in the number of beneficiary complaints over time.
To capture (a) we account for linear time trends by including dummies 
(Yeart) for the year in which the particular audit was conducted (dummy 
for each year between 2006 and 2010). The assumption here is that aver-
age awareness among beneficiaries would be higher in say, 2008 relative 
to 2006, due to repeated program exposure and irrespective of the number 
of audits conducted. A similar argument holds for (b).
Third, as pointed out earlier, some districts are more likely to be more 
(less) effective MGNREGA implementers. For instance, biometric benefi-
ciary identification was introduced in some districts before others. Such 
district-level variations in technological advances, in program activity (i.e., 
number of MGNREGA projects or program expenditures) or in bureaucratic 
capacity, could influence the quality of program delivery and reported 
irregularities directly. Thus, to account for differences in program imple-
mentation trends across districts, we interact the dummy variable for each 
district with the dummy for each audit year (Dl*Yeart) and include these as 
additional controls.
In our second line of inquiry, we study the effect of audits on real pro-
gram expenditures and employment generation. Specifically, we estimate 
the following model:
  NREGAjkl,(t+1) =  β0+ ∑βn Auditn,t + β3Xjkl + β4Dk  
+∑θt Yeart + ∑δlt (Dl*Yeart) + εnjklt  (2)
NREGAjkl,(t+1) is employment and expenditure under the program in GP j in 
mandal k in district l at time t+1. Auditn,t is a dummy variable for the nth 
audit in period t. The other variables are as described for our first specifica-
tion. Note that our data pertain to audits 1 to 3. Since the outcome variable 
relates to the years between successive audits, the audit dummy variables 
314 Ind Ia  pol Icy  forum,  2013–14
included in the specification are for audits 1 and 2 for the years in our 
study. The corresponding MGNREGA data are for the cumulated outcome 
after the nth audit and before the (n+1) audit. Thus βn is an indicator of the 
impact of an audit on subsequent expenditures and employment generated 
under the program.
A remaining challenge is to decipher the interpretational possibilities that 
social audit data, in their present form, give rise to. Put differently, even if 
the social audits were implemented as RCTs with “impacts” amenable to 
robust identification, beneficiary complaints data could suffer from reporting 
biases that our (or an RCT-based) methodology is unable to fully account 
for. For instance, a decline in complaints may be due to intimidation by 
transgressors of beneficiaries who complained in previous audit rounds. 
Thus, fewer program irregularities may not reflect a genuine decline in 
malfeasance. In a similar manner, local politics may affect complainant 
behavior with a rise in complaints reflecting political maneuvering to harm, 
e.g., an incumbent.
To address this concern we undertake a robustness check of our main 
results by restricting the analysis to complaints filed by the audit team alone. 
We thus assume that the members of the audit team are unlikely to be intimi-
dated or threatened and less likely to be swayed by local political biases.
7. Results
We first discuss results for the number of reported irregularities followed 
by program performance outcomes. Table 5 presents results on variation 
in the reported total, labor-related and material-related irregularities across 
audits, controlling for elected sarpanch and GP attributes, overall time trends 
(which, as noted, pick up changes in audit quality and awareness levels), 
district-specific trends, and mandal fixed effects. The specification, thus, 
assumes that unobservable differences in mandal characteristics and district 
specific trends may influence program quality. In column 1, the dependent 
variable is the total number of complaints filed in a social audit, while in 
columns 2 and 3 the outcomes of interest are the total numbers of labor and 
material complaints, respectively.27
27. When we account for whether the district belongs to the most disadvantaged and 
politically sensitive area of Telangana (north-west AP) or not, the results suggest that while 
the total number of complaints decreased by audit 3 in non-Telangana districts, Telangana 
experienced increases in complaints in both audits 2 and 3. Non-Telangana districts showed 
a decline in labor complaints filed in audit 3 relative to audit 1. Material-related complaints 
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T A B L E  5 .  Effect of Social Audits on Total Irregularities
All irregularities
Labor-related 
irregularities
Material-related 
irregularities
(1) (2) (3)
(1) audit 2 2.528* 1.740 0.818**
(1.430) (1.158) (0.407)
(2) audit 3 2.695 1.409 1.345**
(1.973) (1.680) (0.553)
(3) constant 9.457 11.73** –2.788
(6.375) (5.565) (1.694)
(4) audit 3 – audit 2 0.166 –0.330 0.526*
(1.028) (0.963) (0.275)
r-square 0.420 0.448 0.282
number of audits 685 685 685
year fixed effects y y y
mandal fixed effects y y y
district-specific trends y y y
Source: authors’ calculations from data extracted from official social audit reports.
notes: all specifications include controls for sarpanch’s age, sex, caste, education, prior political experience; 
availability of bank, communication, medical facility, and middle school in the Gp; proportion of cultivated 
area which is irrigated, distance to town, population density, and whether the Gp is the mandal headquarter. 
Standard errors clustered at the Gp level reported in parentheses. ***significant at 1%, ** 5%, and *10%.
In column 1, the coefficient on audit 2 is positive and significant while 
the audit 3 coefficient is insignificant. Thus, overall, aggregate irregularities 
were higher in audit 2 than in audit 1 while there is no significant difference 
between audits 2 and 3 (row 4). Next, column 2 shows that labor complaints 
were not higher in rounds 2 and 3 relative to round 1. However, in column 
3 we find more material complaints in audit rounds 2 and 3: a 197% and 
324% increase, respectively, relative to round 1. There were also more such 
complaints in audit 3 than in audit 2 (row 4). Thus, there appears to have 
been a secular rise in irregularities related to material expenditure. Hence 
the increase in total complaints, albeit insignificant in audit 3, was likely 
driven by the rise in material complaints.
In Table 6, we classify labor- and material-related irregularities into 
“ETD” and “HTD” as discussed in the conceptual framework section earlier. 
Hence, within the labor component of the program—non-payment or delays 
in wage payments and non-provision of work are ETD while benami and 
bribe-related irregularities are classified as HTD. The results suggest that 
any increase in the number of labor-related irregularities was due to more 
were significantly higher in Telangana districts in audit 3. It is possible that the effect of social 
audits in non-Telangana regions is insignificant because the levels of corruption or program 
mismanagement are very low in those areas, to begin with.
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complaints about non-payment or delay in wage payments in audit 2 relative 
to audit 1 (column 1). These were, however, not significantly higher in audit 
3 relative to audit 1 or between audits 2 and 3 (column 1, row 4). We thus 
conclude that there was an insignificant increase in the number of complaints 
related to non-payment or delay in wage payments over the three audit 
rounds. Interestingly, the number of complaints related to non-provision of 
MGNREGA work declined in both rounds 2 and 3, albeit insignificantly in 
the latter as shown in column 2. As a result, there was no significant decline 
in irregularities related to the non-provision of work over successive audits 
(column 2, row 4). Further, there was an insignificant effect of audits 2 and 
3 on irregularities due to corrupt practices (i.e., benami wages, bribes, etc. 
in columns 3 and 4) relative to round 1. However, the negative coefficient 
in row 4, column 3, suggests that irregularities related to ghost workers may 
have declined between audits 2 and 3.
Columns 5–8 show that the increase in material-related complaints 
in audit 2 was driven by the rise in ETD ghost or non-existent projects 
(column 5, row 1), and the harder-to-detect irregularities due to missing offi-
cial records on material expenditure (column 8, row 1). However, by audit 3, 
the number of non-existent projects was not higher than in audit 1 (column 
5, row 2). Overall, the secular increase in material-related complaints over 
the three audit rounds seems to have been driven by the significant increase 
in bribes and missing expenditure records (columns 7 and 8, row 4).
In Table 7, we present results for the effect of audits on direct measures 
of program performance, as in equation (2). Our sample is restricted to 
GPs with three audits between 2006 and 2010. Relative to program per-
formance post audit 1, there was an insignificant increase in real program 
expenditures post audit 2 as shown by the coefficient on audit 2 in column 1. 
Interestingly, there was a marginal decline in the proportion of program 
expenditures on rural roads projects where the avenues for corruption may 
be higher as shown in column 2 (World Bank 2011). Total MGNREGA 
employment generated increased insignificantly (column 3) while there was 
no change in the proportion of SC and ST person days in total MGNREGA 
employment (columns 4 and 5). These findings line up with those in 
Tables 5 and 6—suggesting that the impacts of audits on program outcomes 
were, at best, marginal.
To summarize, we observe insignificant changes in the ETD complaints, 
but a substantive rise in HTD, material complaints. These patterns are 
consistent with the earlier discussion of stakes and evidence on beneficiary 
learning. In spite of such learning and the greater capacity of the partici-
patory part of the audit process to detect irregularities, illustrated by the 
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T A B L E  7 .  Effect of Social Audits on Program Performance
Expenditure Employment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total real 
expenditure  
(in lakh `)
Proportion 
of rural 
connectivity 
works
Total 
employment 
generated in 
person days
Proportion  
of SC  
person days 
generated
Proportion  
of ST  
person days 
generated
(1) audit 2 18.73 –0.128* 24581.8 0.016 –0.007
(12.12) (0.075) (15079.0) (0.048) (0.042)
(2) constant 17.27 0.098 39999.9 –0.150 0.929***
(27.05) (0.170) (37536.4) (0.235) (0.278)
r-square 0.666 0.491 0.649 0.616 0.733
n 391 390 391 390 390
Source: authors’ calculations from data extracted from official social audit reports.
notes: results reported for equation 2 in the text. controls as described in Table 5. columns (2) and (4)–(5) 
are calculated as proportions of columns (1) and (3), respectively. Standard errors clustered at the Gp level 
reported in parentheses. ***significant at 1%, ** 5%, and *10%.
increasingly advanced complaints submitted by beneficiaries, the social 
audits were ineffective in systematically reducing the ETD irregularities. 
We interpret the observed rise in material-related malfeasance, without an 
accompanying reduction in the ETD irregularities, as an underlying change 
in the anatomy of corruption and a failure of the social audit process to deter 
malpractice: it appears that transgressors adapted to the new monitoring 
regime by looking for additional avenues of rent extraction as suggested by 
Olken and Pande (2011).28 Given that the average real amount per material-
related irregularity was significantly greater than for irregularities related to 
labor (mentioned earlier), the structural shift in program leakages suggests 
that the benefits from rent extraction were sufficiently higher than the cost 
of effort and any expected punishment following detection of material-
related theft.
28. Quoting Aiyar et al. (2013):
With the help of an information technology company—Tata Consultancy Services—
the government of Andhra Pradesh developed an end-to-end management informa-
tion system (MIS) through which job cards, work estimates, and payment orders are 
issued. The data are collected and input (entered electronically) at the mandal level, 
and consolidated at the state level. Information on each job card holder, including 
number of days worked and total wages received, is accessible through the MIS. All 
data are public and available for scrutiny. To streamline payment processes, wages 
are paid directly through workers’ post office or bank accounts. (Authors’ emphasis)
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7.1. Robustness Checks
The results on leakages, so far, are from a sample with variation in the number 
of audits across mandals. It is possible that mandals which were audited 
more frequently during 2006–10 report higher incidence of MGNREGA 
irregularities because they were relatively more corrupt. As a result, the 
coefficient on audit 3 would, for instance, be biased upwards. To account for 
this possibility, we report the results in Table 8 for the data restricted to GPs 
where three audits were conducted during 2006–10. Our results are largely 
unchanged from those for the unrestricted sample. While the number of 
irregularities related to non-payment and delays in wage payment (column 1, 
rows 1 and 2) and bribes (column 4, row 1) increased, complaints related to 
non-provision of MGNREGA work (column 4, row 1) declined relative to 
audit 1. The secular rise in material complaints was driven by an increase in 
material-related bribes (column 7, row 4) and missing expenditure records 
(column 8, row 4).
So far, we have analyzed the data for complaints filed by individuals, 
groups of beneficiaries as well as discrepancies unearthed by the audit team 
itself. Even though our specification attempts to address the challenges 
posed by beneficiary learning, other beneficiary biases and threats to or 
intimidation of beneficiaries, may influence the reporting of irregularities. 
This in turn would influence our interpretation of outcomes of interest 
and get reflected in changes in the number of irregularities over time. To 
address this possibility, we restrict attention to the irregularities registered 
by the audit team which should be immune from such biases. As before, 
improvement in audit quality is accounted for by the time trends. Table 9 
shows these results for the same outcomes reported earlier. Crucially, our 
conclusions are unchanged when we observe the coefficients reported in 
row 4 across all columns. In Table 10, we include an additional control for 
the real expenditures under the program in each GP in the financial year(s) 
prior to the date of the audit (or for the period audited) to account for the 
possibility that the number of irregularities would rise if the intensity of the 
program increases (even after controlling secular trends). Once more, our 
results are consistent with those in previous tables.
A final interpretational concern is from a welfare perspective: it may be 
more relevant to study whether the rupee value (in real terms) per complaint 
has changed with more audits rather than the number of complaints. Hence, 
while the number of complaints has risen, the rupee amount of these irregu-
larities may have declined when compared to the early days of the program. 
Table 11 shows the results for the same specifications as earlier but with 
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the dependent variable now representing the rupee amount per complaint 
(in 2006 rupees). The first three columns are restricted to audits where a 
complaint amount was mentioned while the next three columns are restricted 
to audits where any complaint was filed. If no amount was mentioned in the 
complaint, the amount per complaint is coded as zero. Missing amounts are 
more likely for complaints related to non-provision of work or wage payment 
delays. Across both definitions of the dependent variable, we find that the 
amount per complaint declined between the second and third audits for total 
complaints and labor complaints (row 4—columns 1, 2 and 4, 5) while there 
is no difference in the material complaint amounts (row 4—columns 3 and 6). 
This again suggests that the social audits may have had only a marginal 
impact on labor-related irregularities but have made little difference on the 
material front.29
7.2. Heterogeneity
In this section, we discuss whether and how the quality of MGNREGA 
implementation is associated with mandal-level characteristics. In the 
mandal survey, we interviewed current MPDOs. However, in several man-
dals MPDOs were transferred frequently. Frequent transfers of MPDOs 
could indicate political interference—either in response to irregularities in 
program implementation or, alternatively, be the cause of such irregularities. 
Note that we do not find a correlation between the number of irregularities 
in an audit for which the MPDO has been held responsible and the number 
of MPDOs posted in that mandal since 2006. We next split the sample by 
those mandals with less than median MPDO transfers (in our sample of 100 
mandals the median number of MPDOs in each mandal since 2006 was 2, 
excluding the current MPDO) and those with higher than median transfers. 
The results are reported in Table 12.
The top panel in Table 12 reports the results for less than median transfers 
of MPDOs. We find a significant decline in non-provision of MGNREGA 
work (column 4) in both audits 2 and 3 relative to audit 1. Overall, there 
was a marginal increase in missing material expenditure records between 
audits 2 and 3 (column 11) but no overall change in the number of labor- 
or material-related irregularities between audits 2 and 3 (columns 2 and 7, 
respectively).
In contrast, the bottom panel regressions for higher than median MPDO 
transfers suggest a significant and monotonic increase in the number of 
29. A caveat to the results reported in Table 11 is potential selection bias: data on amounts 
are available only if an amount was mentioned in the complaint.
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material-related irregularities relative to audit 1 (column 7). This was 
driven by an increase in material-related bribes (column 10) and missing 
expenditure records (column 11) in audits 2 and 3 relative to audit 1. Thus, 
it is apparent that the results on material expenditures presented earlier for 
the entire sample are driven by mandals with frequent MPDO transfers. 
If transfers were in response to irregularities, then there should have been 
a declining trend in the number of irregularities in these mandals. On the 
contrary, the number of material-related irregularities rose consistently 
within these mandals. This suggests that transfers of bureaucrats could 
be an instrument used by the political class to influence the delivery of 
MGNREGA at the local level.
8. Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
The AP social audit model is being scaled up and adopted by other Indian 
states and other public programs. In the introduction, we briefly reviewed 
what evidence tells us about the potential of participatory monitoring of 
the type the AP model has been developed around. Our first observation, 
which simply borrows Mansuri and Rao’s (2013) conclusion, is that effec-
tive induced participation is difficult to achieve. At the same time, carefully 
crafted participatory interventions may (dramatically) improve (health) ser-
vice delivery (BS 2009). Given the many similarities between BS’s (2009) 
intervention and AP’s social audits, there are thus grounds for optimism on 
behalf of the AP model. The zero impact of community mobilization and 
information sharing on teaching quality and learning outcomes in UP, reported 
by Banerjee et al. (2010), offers an important and sobering caveat. As our 
empirical results demonstrate, in relying on participation and social account-
ability, it is necessary to tread carefully and recognize potential pitfalls. 
 Detection of audit “impacts” is made harder both by the fact that social 
audits were not implemented randomly and by the type of information 
(complaints) recorded by the social audit team. We, therefore, analyze the 
marginal impact of repeated audits within the same GPs during 2006–10. 
Controlling mandal-level attributes, overall and district-level time trends to 
address the confounders discussed earlier, we observe a marginal reduction in 
the real amount per labor complaint but an insignificant effect of the repeated 
social audit process on reducing the aggregate number of complaints. This 
is accompanied by an overall increase in the aggregate number of harder-
to-detect material-related irregularities over successive audit rounds with 
no change in the number of ETD irregularities.
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Based on our behavioral assumptions, we expected a decline in the ETD 
irregularities in which beneficiaries have high stakes and audit teams, as 
well as beneficiaries, have sufficient detection capacity. Although there is 
some indication of an overall decline in the amount of theft in labor-related 
irregularities, we do not observe a decline in any ETD labor- or material-
related irregularities with successive audit rounds.30 Given our results, we 
can claim that while the top-down and participatory elements of the audit 
process have been effective in detecting irregularities, the audits are not an 
effective deterrent and have thus been unable to reduce irregularities.
Any marginal decline in the amount per labor-related administrative 
irregularity is, moreover, outweighed by the accompanying increase in the 
number of material-related complaints. We have seen that the complaints 
submitted by beneficiaries become increasingly sophisticated while the 
audit team complaints remain mostly confined to HTD irregularities. Given 
that we control time trends, we interpret the observed shift in the pattern of 
irregularities as reflective of transgressors responding to a new monitoring 
regime and the need to stay one step ahead of this monitoring regime. The 
threat of punishment may not have been credible for higher level program 
functionaries who are likely to be responsible (as much as, if not more than, 
lower level functionaries) for HTD, material-related malfeasance.
Note that the majority of labor-related irregularities were pinned on a 
GP-level, contractual functionary—the field assistant—who is typically a GP 
resident. The “naming and shaming” element of the public hearings might 
have been an effective deterrent for this particular functionary. However, 
social sanctions are unlikely to have a significant impact on curtailing 
malpractice among higher level program functionaries who are typically 
non-residents of the GP, such as the MPDO.
These results take us back to BS (2009) and to the social contract that 
their participatory process culminates in. We refer to this as the tightness of 
the social audit process. In spite of the promising prospects for community-
based monitoring of work provision and of labor-related expenditures, for 
the years that we have studied (2006–10), the follow up and enforcement 
of social audit findings in AP were weak: this may contribute to explain 
the limited success of the social audit process in deterring malfeasance. As 
shown in Table 13, while this weakness may have been mitigated by the 
30. During the period of our study the state introduced significant technological innovations 
in the monitoring and processing of labor payments. A centralized computer system where 
muster-rolls are verified and payments made on a weekly basis through computer generated 
pay orders at the mandal level may, alongside the audits, have helped to mitigate leakages 
in labor payments.
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establishment of the vigilance cells in AP in 2010, less than 1% of irregulari-
ties for which one or multiple program functionaries were held responsible 
ended in termination/dismissal/removal from service or criminal action for 
the period under study (and until 2013). Furthermore, 87% of the miss-
ing amounts were yet to be recovered. The effectiveness of social audits 
in deterring theft and other malpractice, in spite of all their other inherent 
merits, may thus be undermined by a single design weakness, or slip-up. 
A key lesson for AP and for states emulating the AP model would thus be 
to ensure that social audits culminate in the type of enforceable and credible 
“contract” that allocates responsibilities, defines timelines, and ensures that 
those who have been found guilty of irregularities are promptly punished. 
The credibility of the social audit process rests ultimately on the ability and 
willingness of the state government to take effective remedial action and 
punish offenders.
In principle, the modest impact of social audits could also reflect a 
problem of capacity on the part of social audit teams. In our discussions 
earlier, we assume that as the social audit process is repeated, core social 
audit personnel learn and amass new knowledge and understanding. This 
should make audits increasingly effective and auditors more able to detect 
more sophisticated irregularities. This conjecture is only plausible if core 
personnel stays put or learning is effectively transferred to new staff.31
Apart from the results outlined earlier, our work here underlines the 
need for incorporating rigorous program evaluation in the roll out of audits. 
Furthermore, greater vigilance in the documentation of social audit evidence, 
which could be critical for assessing the impact of these audits, is essential. 
For instance, all social audit reports include questions on the total rupee 
amount of irregularities, the total amount of MGNREGA expenditures 
subjected to audit, etc., to be filled in by the audit team. But these data are 
not entered in the vast majority of social audit reports for the period and 
sample under study. Careful documentation of audit findings would, again, 
require improvements in the training of auditors and greater emphasis on 
the importance of more complete documentation in the training modules.
The AP experience has uniquely benefitted from the top level and strong 
political commitment to the social audit process. The state has also demon-
strated a strong willingness to experiment with the use of technology and 
31. Experience-based skill accumulation may become obsolete if the portfolio of 
MGNREGA projects undergoes significant change. This is an issue other adopting states 
need to pay attention to. Intensification of scrutiny may shift priorities toward projects with 
more material expenditure and harder to detect irregularities. 
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other mechanisms to strengthen monitoring and the quality of MGNREGA 
delivery (Murali 2013). These favorable initial conditions have, no doubt, 
critically aided and bolstered the potential of the social audit process in AP. 
A key question is whether similar preconditions are likely to be present in 
the other states that are now seeking to replicate the AP model. Our study 
underlines the advantages of a top-down component in designing social 
audits to leverage grassroots participation.
Following the transition from the work fare programs prior to the rights-
based MGNREGA, between 2004–05 and 2008–09 there has been a three-
fold increase in Central government funds allocated to rural work projects 
(Afridi 2008). In 2011–12, the Act had provided employment to almost 40 
million households at an annual expenditure of almost `40,000 crores across 
the country while the cost of conducting these audits is merely 1% of this 
expenditure. The potential benefits of the program are large but the cost of 
making certain that they are realized is low. In moving forward, we reiter-
ate the high stakes in ensuring the success of the social audit mechanism.
Appendix
T A B L E  A 1 .  Number of Irregularities Per District Per Audit
Audit#
Mahbub-
nagar Medak Warangal 
Ananta-
pur Kurnool Guntur
Nizama-
bad Khammam
audit1
[n=36]
4.972
(3.714)
[n=37]
3.297
(2.259)
[n=41]
4.317
(2.240)
[n=36]
6.111
(3.970)
[n=33]
5.121
(3.621)
[n=33]
2.090
(2.517)
[n=36]
4.972
(3.009)
[n=32]
10.625
(6.791)
audit2
[n=36]
7.333
(4.296)
[n=33]
5.181
(3.486)
[n=39]
6.949
(5.370)
[n=36]
4.389
(3.728)
[n=33]
5.848
(6.251)
[n=12]
2.833
(1.850)
[n=36]
5.167
(4.532)
[n=36]
9.833
(7.588)
audit3
 [n=6]
6.667
(3.502)
[n=36]
5.611
(7.184)
[n=42]
8.405
(7.960)
[n=14]
2.214
(2.326)
[n=9]
3.444
(2.297)
[n=32]
7.75
(6.289)
[n=27]
5.518
(4.577)
Source: authors’ calculations from data extracted from official social audit reports.
note: number of observations in square brackets. Standard errors in parentheses.
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